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I.

Introduction
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was created in 2002 as a

component of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Previously self-regulated, auditors of publicly
traded companies are now subject to oversight from an outside and independent organization.
One primary mission of the PCAOB is to ensure the informational integrity and transparency of
the auditor’s report to benefit all relevant stakeholders (PCAOB 2014b). The Board is always
looking for new ways to enhance the content of the report, and make it more useful for
individuals. After months of substantial research and tests, the Board may choose to release a
new proposal for an amendment to the report. Two proposed auditing standards were recently
released by PCAOB to increase the information content of the audit reports. First, Release no.
2013-009 would require the name of the engagement partner to be disclosed in the audit report.
In addition, the names, locations, and extent of participation of other accounting firms in the
audit would also be disclosed (PCAOB 2013b). This is intended to increase the transparency of
the audit process to financial statement users. Next, Release no. 2013-005 proposes that the
auditor to communicate Critical Audit Matters (CAMS) in the audit report. The CAMs are areas
of the financial statements which are subject to a higher risk of material misstatement (PCAOB
2013a). Overall, the proposals aim to improve the transparency and extent of information in
public company audits while maintaining the mission of the PCAOB.
While both proposals still need final approval by both the PCAOB and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the previously mentioned changes would be the most significant
to audit reporting in the last 40 to 50 years. The US auditor’s report featured very little change
since the 1940s, and many stakeholders believe that it does not provide enough information that
is specific to a particular audit. Therefore, PCAOB strives to increase the information content of
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the report through the proposed auditing standards. This thesis will describe the existing audit
report, the details of each proposal, and analyze and evaluate the comment letters related to the
proposals that the PCAOB received from various financial reporting stakeholders (PCAOB
2013a). The results of my comment letter analysis suggest that the signature requirement would
not increase audit quality, but may increase individual liability for the audit partner. The results
also suggest that the inclusion of CAMs and other information would create confusion for users
of the audit report, and may be costly to implement through increases in audit work and time.
From this, one will be able to better understand what is included in the current audit report, and
how the proposed auditing standards may impact the information content on a prospective basis.

II.

The Audit Report & Related Documentation
The standard audit report is the end means of documenting and communicating the

auditor’s work in evaluation management’s financial statements, and the communication of a
report is expressly included in the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (PCAOB 2013a). In
the United States, the auditor’s report has changed very little since the 1940s. The current
pass/fail model being used is believed to be useful because of its clear and concise assessment of
the fair presentation of the financial statements (PCAOB 2013a). In the early 1900s, auditors
wrote free-form audit reports for each client, because no auditing standards existed at that time
(PCAOB 2011). By the 1920s, the audit report was reduced to one paragraph and served as a
certification by the auditor that the balance sheet was accurate. Understanding that the auditor’s
report was an opinion and not a guarantee, report wording was changed in 1934 to remove the
term ‘certify.’ The audit report would be left unchanged until the 1980s, until pressures from
congressional hearings and recommendations from the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting caused the formal addition of the scope paragraph (PCAOB 2011).
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Today’s traditional audit report consists of three key paragraphs: introductory, scope, and
final opinion. The introductory paragraph highlights the financial statements and documents that
have been audited and are part of the auditor’s opinion. This paragraph also specifically outlines
the responsibilities of management and the auditor during the engagement. For example, the
preparation of the financial statements is the responsibility of the Company’s management. The
scope paragraph explains the nature of the audit, including basic methods used. It is important
for the auditor to communicate that the audit can only provide reasonable assurance of
conformity with GAAP and risk of material misstatement. The auditor will also outline the
accounting principles used, and any estimates made by management within the financial
statements. Lastly, the opinion paragraph details the auditor’s final opinion based on all of the
evidence obtained during the audit. The auditor will complete the report with a manual or printed
signature of the name of the audit firm (AU Section 508).
In addition to the audit report, auditors are required to keep work papers that serve as a
written record for the basis of their conclusions. Examples of such documentation include
confirmations, schedules, letters of representation, and general correspondence. The auditor must
document procedures performed, all gathered evidence, and conclusions as they pertain to
relevant financial statement assertions. This documentation must contain sufficient detail to
clearly demonstrate its purpose, source, and conclusions reached. It also must be detailed enough
in order to enable an experienced auditor, with no prior connection to the engagement, the ability
to fully understand the work that was done during the audit (PCAOB 2004).
It was not until recently that the content and informational value of the report has come
under public scrutiny. Recent research about the sufficiency of the audit report has yielded mixed
results. A survey by Asare and Wright (2009) of investors, auditors, and lenders found that the
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audit report is seen as useful to these decision makers. A report issued by the Center for Audit
Quality (CAQ 2011) indicate that the unqualified audit report serves as a starting point for
investors to make their decisions, and that the primary role of the auditor should not change. On
the contrary, a focus-group study conducted by Gray et al. (2011) questions the sufficiency on
the current audit report. Participants of this focus group included financial statement preparers,
users, and external auditors. Results show that users have difficulty understanding key concepts
in the audit report such as materiality and reasonable assurance. In addition, many participants
voiced that they only look to see if the auditor’s opinion is unqualified, and do not actually read
the report in full. A CFA Institute (2010) survey has also identified that stakeholders want more
information in the audit report from the auditor. The survey results, communicated by Mock et
al. (2011) show the following:





94% of participants want more information in the audit report
60% believe the report must contain more information about the audit process
72% want more information about the auditor’s independence; and
66% desire information about actual levels of assurance achieved in the audits

It is clear that investors and financial statement users want more audit specific information,
as well as a report that is more transparent, in order to potentially make better investment
decisions. This scrutiny has served as a catalyst for the proposed audit reporting changes being
considered today. The PCAOB recognizes the perceived need for additional information about
the audit process specific to each company, and the Board proposed two potential audit
standards. The first could require the personal signature of the engagement partner on the audit
report. The second could require the disclosure of CAMs and other information specific to each
audit. I will discuss the details of each proposal in turn.
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III.

PCAOB Release No. 2013-009: Improving Transparency Through Disclosure of
Engagement Partner and Certain Other Participants in Audits
In an effort to increase the transparency of public company audits, the PCAOB proposed

this amendment that would require the disclosure in the auditor’s report (1) the name of the
engagement partner and (2) the names, locations, and extent of participation of other independent
public accounting firms that took part in the audit. The Board’s mission to provide “informative,
accurate, and independent audit reports” would be further accomplished through the above
disclosures (PCAOB 2013b). Investors and financial statement users should have access to as
much meaningful information as possible about a public company so that they may make
informed decisions about the company’s financial strength and about the integrity of the
company’s management.
As it currently stands in the United States, only the name of the firm that issued the
opinion is disclosed in the auditor’s report. Although the US is not the only country that follows
this lack of transparency, several other well-established jurisdictions follow a much different
practice. Members of the European Union (EU), Taiwan, and Australia all require the disclosure
of the names of the auditors conducting the audit, the engagement partner on the audit, or both.
In addition, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) has also
proposed a new requirement for audit firms to disclose the name of the engagement partner
(PCAOB 2013b). If the proposal is adopted, all jurisdictions that follow IAASB standards will
begin following this level of disclosure. It is just another indication that there is a global trend
toward greater transparency about public company audits, as well as who is conducting them.
The PCAOB has always been pressured by investors to provide more information about
the independent audit, particularly information about the auditors involved. It is believed that
disclosure of the engagement partner’s name would prompt them to perform their duties more
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carefully, and with a greater sense of accountability to the various end users of the auditor’s
report. It is not yet known what effect this proposal would have on audit fees or audit
competition. The focus, however, would be to see an increase in audit quality as a result of a
mandatory signing. It is important to note that the EU’s policy of mandatory partner-level
signatures is not expected to increase individual liability for the audit partner (Blay et al. 2012).
The audit partner’s name is already publicly available in the case of an audit failure (Mock et al.
2013). For this reason, reputation is the most likely reason for an increase in audit quality (Blay
et al. 2012). Blay et al. (2012) attempts to gain greater understanding into audit quality effects of
the EU’s policy of mandatory partner-level signatures. It was difficult to create a powerful test to
analyze effects of mandatory adoption of an engagement partner signature requirement. All EU
member states adopted the policy at the same time, with no early or late control groups, making
comparisons unreliable. Through multi-year analysis of audit quality in the Netherlands and
United Kingdom, they were unable to find evidence to support the argument of improved audit
quality when there is a requirement to disclose the engagement partner’s name. Abnormal
accruals, magnitude of accruals relative to cash flows, and earnings benchmark tests were used
as proxies to test the audit quality effects (Blay et al. 2012). The two countries adopted partnerlevel signatures at different times, which allowed for comparison between a range of years when
one country had already adopted the policy and the other had yet to require an audit partner
signature.
The Board has been discussing the idea of disclosure requirements since 2005, when it
started to consider ways to make the auditor’s report more informative. It was not until July 28,
2009 that the PCAOB issued the concept release on the matter. Initially, many investors
supported the requirement, while many other commenters expressed their concerns. Those
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opposed of the disclosure requirement believed it would result in an increase in the engagement
partner’s liability by making them the focus, and not the accounting firm as a whole. After over 2
years of experience and commenters’ views, the Board issued the first proposing release on
October 11, 2011, which proposed official amendment to the auditing standards that would
require disclosure of the engagement partner’s name in the auditor’s report (PCAOB 2013b).
Those that commented on this release were split. As was expected, accounting firms generally
opposed the requirement to disclose the name of the engagement partner, while investors and
some corporate officials argued in favor of the proposal.
On December 4, 2013 the PCAOB released proposal no. 2013-009 as the latest attempt to
make disclosure amendments. The first part of this new proposal would require the disclosure of
the name of the engagement partner for the most recent period’s audit. Although this may not
provide much useful information in the short term, a history of information about a specific
partner will be developed over time. This, when connected with other information, could help
investors and other financial statement users make better overall investment decisions. Public
disclosure of the current engagement partner is just an initial first step in the development of
information sources such as engagement, litigation, and education history (PCAOB 2013b).
The second component of release no. 2013-009 would require the disclosure of certain
other participants in the audit. This information would either be included in a paragraph
following the auditor’s opinion, or in an appendix following the auditor’s report. The
information about other participants would include (PCAOB 2013b) :




the name of the firm(s)/person(s)
the country of headquarters, or primary country of residence (if single person)
the percentage of work hours attributable to the audit performed by the other participants

The proposal would not require the disclosure of the following participants:
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individuals employed by the company to provide direct assistance to the auditor (internal
auditors or other company personnel)
individuals performing the engagement quality review (EQR)

As businesses become increasingly globalized, it is important to understand that many
international companies are audited by PCAOB-registered public accounting firms (especially
the ‘Big Four’). In these cases, it is likely that other firms from all over the world participated in
the audits of these companies. As a measure of cost-effectiveness, the US-based accounting firm
will sometimes allow the other participants to do a substantial amount of the total audit work, but
will then sign their firm’s name on the bottom of the auditor report (PCAOB 2013b). Regardless
of the degree at which other firms participated in the audit, this places all responsibility on the
signing firm. Knowing the names, locations, and degree of participation of others in the audit
would give users of the audit report the ability to research additional information about the
participants. This falls directly in line with the PCAOB’s mission to make the audit report more
transparent and contain more useful information for those that use it (PCAOB 2013b).
An immediate concern of this proposed amendment is in the effect it will have on
litigation liability for all people named in the auditor’s report. While the Board has examined this
concern since the proposal’s concept release, it believes the potential risk to a named
engagement partner would be justified by the benefits to investors of increased transparency. The
main source of potential liability is Section 11 of the Securities Act. Section 11 of the Securities
Act creates liability for material misstatements or omissions in the auditor’s report, after giving
consent to the inclusion of their names in the report (PCAOB 2013b). This would not change the
performance obligations of the signed engagement partners, or any other participating auditor.
The issuing firm would still file consent and be subject to the same liability as the engagement
partner (PCAOB 2013b). The engagement partner could simply be added to the consent that the
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firm already provides, which would keep any additional administrative costs low. Litigationrelated costs could be more significant than administrative costs, but not cause for concern.
Naming the engagement partner within the audit report would only increase the number of
defendants in a particular lawsuit, but would not necessarily increase the number of lawsuits
filed (PCAOB 2013b). Although accounting firms and other participants may charge higher fees
in response to a consent requirement, the Board believes the added information to the investor is
valuable enough to justify the potential risks to the named auditors (PCAOB 2013b ). Currently,
the open comment period for this proposal is closed as of March 17 th, 2014, and the staff is
analyzing the comments received (PCAOB 2014).

IV.

PCAOB Release No. 2013-005: Proposed Auditing Standards on the Auditor's Report
and the Auditor's Responsibilities Regarding Other Information
In an effort to increase the informational value of the auditor’s report to its users, the

PCAOB has created such a proposal that aims to increase the report’s value through providing
more information about the particular audit. During a financial statement audit, auditors gather
information concerning the company, its environment, and the preparation of the financial
statements. Investors have expressed that they would benefit from this type of information,
because much of it they do not already have access to. Auditors have much more insight into the
companies that they audit, which leaves investors and users of the reports wishing the audit
reports were more relevant to the specific audit.
The current audit report has not changed significantly since the early 1940s. The current
reporting model struggles at best to address the increase in global business operations. Through
outreach activities, the PCAOB has determined that the auditor’s report has little, if any,
communicative value. In addition, the PCAOB is facing external international pressures to
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change its audit report structure (PCAOB 2013a). Several international standard setters,
including the IAASB, have been making similar attempts to change their auditor reports.
The Board’s proposed standard would keep the current pass/fail model, as well as the
basic elements of the current auditor’s report. The auditor would be required, however, to
communicate critical audit matters (CAMs) within the auditor’s report that would be specific to
each audit (PCAOB 2013a). CAMs include issues during that audit that involved the most
difficult or complex auditor judgments, or were the most difficult in gathering an appropriate
amount of audit evidence. If this information is made available to investors and financial
statement users, it could bridge the gap of information asymmetry that exists between company
management and the investors. Under this proposed standard, the critical audit matters would be
described in the auditor’s report as such (PCAOB 2013a):




Identifying the critical audit matter,
Describing the factors that led to the decision that the matter was a critical audit matter;
and
Using related accounts and disclosures to support the CAM if necessary

This information on CAMs could allow the investor to take a closer look at the parts of
the financial statements the auditor found to be challenging. Management usually knows the
challenging areas of the audit due to their regular communications with the auditors during the
audit. The investors do not get to communicate to the auditors before, during, or after the audit,
and therefore do not have the same access to the same information. This proposal aims to
alleviate this issue through the inclusion of CAMs in the body of the auditor’s report.
Christensen et al. (2014) analyzed how investors react to a CAM paragraph centered on
the audit of fair value estimates, compared to how investors react to fair value footnote
disclosures. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International
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Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have required fair value footnote disclosures to help
investor understanding of its inherent uncertainty (Christensen et al. 2014). It is argued that a
CAM paragraph draws more attention, takes less effort to process, and has higher source
credibility than footnote disclosures. The results are consistent with the auditors’ expectation.
Sirois et al. (2013) used eye-tracking technology in an experiment to examine how the
inclusion of CAMs affects the way users read the report and integrate the information in the
related financial statements. Using post-graduate accounting students, participants were given
one of four different audit reports, and an evaluation was conducted of each participant’s
behavior. Research suggests that users of audit reports are often faced with cognitive overload,
where a task demands too much from their cognitive resources (Mayer and Moreno 2003).
Results of the experiment show the disclosure of CAMs within the audit report significantly
affects users’ information acquisition (Sirois et al. 2013). Participants paid closer attention to
items that were disclosed within a CAM paragraph, and were able to more quickly access the
related disclosure in the financial statements (Sirois et al. 2013).
Although the disclosure of CAMs may improve users’ ability to process key information
within the financial statements, other research suggests it may affect jurors’ assessments of
auditor liability. A study conducted by Goodson et al. (2014) examines the standards by which
jurors assess auditor negligence when a CAM paragraph is present in the audit report. The study
uses undergraduate students in a mock trial alleging auditor negligence, and an audit report that
was manipulated on the basis of an emphasis paragraph and clarifying language (Goodson et al.
2014). Results show the following evidence regarding perceived auditor negligence (Goodson et
al. 2014):


Jurors are less likely to view auditors as negligent when the term reasonable assurance is
clarified within the audit report,
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Jurors are more likely to view auditors as negligent when a CAM is identified, specific
audit procedures to address the matter are described, but there is no clarifying language;
and
Jurors negligence assessments are not affected by clarifying language when a CAM is
disclosed with no audit procedures to address the matter

The evidence from this study provides unique insight into the affect this audit reporting
change could have for auditor’s litigation exposure. Changes to litigation risk could have
negative consequences for audit quality and audit fees (Goodson et al. 2014).
The “other information” standard in this proposal focuses on information contained in the
documents that include audited financial statements, but not the information in the financial
statements themselves. This would force the auditor to focus more attention on potential material
misstatements between the other information and the company’s audited financial statements.
The auditor would be able to identify such inconsistencies that may be much more difficult for
investors and other financial statement users to find otherwise. These mistakes occur due to a
number of reasons, ranging from unintentional error to malicious misreporting. Ensuring the
consistency between the audited financial statements and the other information within the same
documents would increase the amount of quality information available to users.
The public comment period for this proposal closed on December 11 th, 2013. The Board
held a public meeting on April 2-3, 2014 the proposal and comments received. The Board
decided to reopen the comment period until May 2 nd, 2014 to give commenters the opportunity to
offer additional views (PCAOB 2014).

V.

Research Methods
Every PCAOB concept release and proposed set of amendments comes with the

opportunity for public comment. Any member of the public is allowed to submit a letter to the
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PCAOB, which is then posted in order of submission under the related docket number. The
majority of submissions come from current and retired CPAs, public accounting firms,
multinational corporations/organizations, and various CPA society groups. The public comments
allow the PCAOB to gain additional insight and knowledge on an issue they are proposing to
solve. This, along with months of discussion, may lead the PCAOB to draft up a new proposal or
approve the current release. Once the proposal has been adopted by the PCAOB, it must be filed
and approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to become effective (PCAOB,
2014c).
In an effort to capture the public’s views on the two proposals of interest, a common
method of content analysis was conducted to provide data on the persons and organizations
commenting, whether or not they support the proposal, and the reasoning behind their arguments.
For each proposal, dozens of comment letters were downloaded, read, and analyzed. Due to time
and data constraints, a haphazard sample was used for this paper. For Release No. 2013-009, 43
comment letters were available at the time of this analysis, and all were used. Release No. 2013005 received over 200 comment letters, but only 51 were analyzed to capture a sample of the
whole. The following information was extracted from each (which is included in Appendix 1):





Author of comment letter
Author’s Company/Organization (if applicable)
Support of the proposal (Y/N)
Summary of reason(s) behind argument

Between the two proposals, a total of 94 comment letters were read and analyzed.
VI.

Results
The results of the comment letter analysis serve as only a sample of the whole. Although

not all of the letters available were analyzed and accounted for, a series of trends made it
possible to make certain conclusions from the data. For PCAOB Release No. 2013-009, 58.1
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percent of respondents were not in favor of the disclosure of the engagement partner and other
audit participants (Table 1). Of those in favor, 15 were from independent organizations and
stakeholders, six audit firms, three university professors, and one preparer (Table 2). Those
respondents that were not in favor of the proposal cited two primary arguments.
First, the disclosure of the engagement partner’s name and signature would not improve
audit quality, and is not meaningful information overall. Engagement partners already work to
produce accurate and complete reports for their clients. Adding their signature to the bottom of
the report will not give investors and financial statement users any additional information of
value. The specific disclosure of the engagement partner places too much emphasis on the role of
one individual. Although the partner is responsible for the outcome of the audit report, the work
leading up to the end product is conducted by a team of many members. This may create
confusion for users of the audit report (Table 3).
Second, the disclosure of the engagement partner could increase unnecessary liability for
that individual. Aside from litigation liability, auditor’s professional reputations are at risk of
being attacked. Through the next decade, data will be accumulating about each engagement
partner. Any blemish in their records may affect their ability to attract new clients. On the other
hand, auditor’s names are generally disclosed to the public in the case of audit failure. So if the
audit fails, it would not have mattered if the audit partner was required to sign their name on the
report to begin with (Table 3).
Of the 41.9 percent of respondents that were in favor of this mandatory disclosure policy,
their primary arguments were mirror opposites from that not in favor. Respondents believed that
requiring the signing of the audit partner’s name in the audit report would improve audit quality,
transparency, and accountability (Table 3). Although an auditor’s name would be disclosed in
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the event of an audit failure, the protection of their reputation is ultimately on the line. Recent
studies support the notion that a personal signature increases honesty and integrity (Davidson
and Stevens 2010), and can lead to increased moral reasoning and lower misreporting of private
information (Blay et al. 2012).
It is important to also consider the opinions of the “Big Four” audit firms. These four
firms audited more than 98.0 percent of the global market capitalization of U.S. issuer
companies, or approximately $25.9 trillion, based on year-end 2012 data (Accountability:
Protecting Investors, the Public Interest and Prosperity). These firms’ opinions are highly
influential because they are regarded as the public’s thought leaders in auditing. The “Big Four”
audit firms were all not in favor of this proposal, except for Deloitte & Touche, LLP (Table 4).
Deloitte & Touche supports the disclosure of the engagement partner’s signature, but not in the
audit report (Deloitte & Touche Comment Letter #27, 2013). The firm believes a more feasible
approach would be to create a database containing all of the required information in this
proposal, which could be accessed by the public. Under this approach, it is believed that
investors will have a single database to locate pertinent information about an audit firm or
individual engagement partner (Deloitte & Touche Comment Letter #27, 2013). The other Big
Four firms (EY, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and KPMG) all believe the current proposal would
result in logistical challenges, litigation risk, and increased audit time and fees.
For Release No. 2013-005, 68.6 percent of the respondents were not in favor of the
proposal to include CAMs and other information into the body of the audit report (Table 5). This
includes 5 audit firms, 2 university professors, 26 independent organizations, and 2 stakeholders
(Table 6). The two main arguments from those not in favor are that it would create confusion for
investors and financial statement users, and it would increase audit costs and time constraints
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(Table 7). Discussing accounting or internal control matters that did not require disclosure under
U.S. GAAP or affect the auditor’s final opinion may create this confusion for investors. Such
disclosure may also weaken investor confidence in the auditor’s opinion on the financial
statements and the effectiveness of internal controls. Also, determining what matters are
“critical” involves a significant amount of subjectivity, which may result in many additional
disclosures. These additional disclosures require substantial additional work for the auditors and
company employees, which could increase costs and time constraints. These arguments were
resonated at the recent PCAOB Public Meeting on April 2-3, 2014 regarding CAMs and other
information in the audit report. Kevin B. Reilly, Americas Vice Chair, Professional Practice and
Risk Management at Ernst & Young believes that the current impact on reporting is unnecessary.
Reilly believes the specific reporting examples in the proposing release are too lengthy. Reilly,
speaking on behalf of Ernst & Young, LLP, supports the disclosure of CAMs and other
information, but in a format that is much more concise while still completing the objectives of
the proposal (PCAOB 2014d). The other three major accounting firms also support the proposal
to disclose CAMs within the audit report, and offer similar constructive suggestions (Table 8).
The primary concern moving forward is clearly interpreting what should be considered a critical
audit matter, and how it should be disclosed in the report in a clear and concise manner.
VII.

Conclusion
In an effort to improve the transparency and informational value of the auditor’s report,

the PCAOB has issued two proposals to accomplish these objectives. The first proposal, release
no. 2013-009, would require the personal signature of the engagement partner on the audit
report. Other participants during the audit would also have to be disclosed, including the degree
of participation (PCAOB 2013b). Results show that the public commenters are generally not in
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favor of this proposal. It is argued that this proposal will not improve audit quality, and may
increase individual liability to the audit partner. The comment period for this proposal is closed,
and information is currently being gathered from the letters before any next step is taken
(PCAOB 2014a). Further research should be conducted to evaluate the audit partner’s signature
effect on audit quality.
The second proposal, release no. 2013-005, would require the disclosure of critical audit
matters and other information specific to each audit. This information would be included in the
audit report as its own distinct paragraph (PCAOB 2013a). Results from public comment show
that respondents are not in favor of this proposal. It is argued that this disclosure requirement
would create confusion for users of the report, would be costly to implement, and would not
provide any meaningful information to investors. The comment period for this proposal is now
closed. The Board is reviewing information from the comment letters as well as from the public
meeting before any next step is taken. The Board should continue discussions to create a flexible
definition of a CAM, and take steps to consolidate the reporting requirement to decrease this
proposal’s impact on audit work, time, and fees.
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VIII.

Appendix

Table 1:

In Support
Not in Support
Total

Release No. 2013-009
# of Respondents
% of Respondents
18
41.9%
25
58.1%
43
100.0%

Table 2:
Type
Audit Firm
Academic
Peparer
Independent Organization
Stakeholder
Total

In Favor Not in Favor
1
6
1
3
3
1
7
10
6
5
18
25

Table 3:

Comment Letter Responses
In Favor
Not in Favor
Will improve audit
Will not improve audit
quality (4)
quality (8)
Will increase
transparency &
accountability (4)

Risk to those named on
the audit (8)
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Table 4:
Firm

Support

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Reason(s)
Supports disclosure of engagement
partner, but not in the auditor's report;
increased liability under Section 11 of
the Securities Act

Y

EY LLP

N

Will result in operational challenges
that will increase the cost, complexity,
and time required for a company to
access the capital markets

KPMG LLP

N

Litigation risks & logistical challenges
from the need to obtain a consent

PwC LLP

N

May not provide meaningful
information to the users, also potential
litigation risk

Table 5:

In Support
Not in Support
Total

Release No. 2013-005
# of Respondents
% of Respondents
16
31.4%
35
68.6%
51
100.0%

Table 6:

Type
Audit Firm
Academic
Peparer
Independent Organization
Stakeholder
Total

In
Favor
5
0
1
9
1
16

Not in
Favor
5
2
0
26
2
35
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Table 7:
Comment Letter Responses
In Favor

Not in Favor

Will enhance
informational value to
users (16)

May create confusion
for users (11)

Will enhance auditor
communications (16)

Costly to implement (9)

Table 8:
Firm

Support

Reason(s)

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Y

EY LLP

Y

KPMG LLP

Y

PwC LLP

Y

See constructive
suggestions (Docket
No. 34, Comment
Letters 132, 143,
179, 228)
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Table 9:
Release 2013-009
Name

Company/
Organization

Thomas F.
Palmeri, CPA

Faith Bautista,
President and
CEO
Carolyn J.
Ridpath,
Compliance
Specialist

National Asian
American Coalition

Vermont Economic
Development
Authority

Farlen
Halikman
Dennis R.
Beresford,
Executive in
Residence
Nancy J.
Schroeder,
CPA, Chair,
Financial
Reporting
Committee
Andre
Kilesse,
President
Charles H.
Noski
Carlos E
Johnson,
CPA, Chair

J.M. Tull School of
Accounting, The
Univ. of Georgia

Respondent
Type

Date
Submitted

Support
Audit
Change?

Reasons
Partner already
must sign name
when applying
for financing,
purchasing
buildings, filing
tax reports

P

12/4/2013

Y

IO

12/6/2013

Y

IO

12/6/2013

Y

S

12/27/2013

N

A

1/6/2014

N

Institute of
Management
Accountants

IO

1/21/2014

N

Federation of
European Accountants

IO

1/22/2014

Y

S

1/13/2014

N

IO

1/24/2014

Y

National Assoc. of
State Boards of
Accountancy

USA is trying
to move
towards more
transparency
and
responsibility
Would make it
easier for the
audit partner to
be hunted down
Not meaningful
information/will
not increase
accountability
Would not
result in
improved audit
quality
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Release 2013-009
Name
James L.
Fuehrmeyer,
Jr. MBA,
CPA

Company/
Organization

Respondent
Type

University of Notre
Dame

A

McGladrey LLP

Date
Submitted

Support
Audit
Change?

1/22/2014

N

AF

1/29/2014

N

Jim Cusenza

S

1/30/2014

N

Sherman L.
Rosenfield,
CPA

P

1/30/2014

N

Chris Barnard,
Actuary

S

1/30/2014

Y

Gilbert F.
Viets

S

1/31/2014

Y

Reasons

places too much
emphasis on the
role of one
individual
does not
provide the
appropriate
context around
or insight into
the partner's
work
experiences or
skill level
inference that
one partner's
signature is
better or more
valuable than
another
unnecessarily
dilute a
stakeholder's
focus
Will increase
transparency
and
accountability;
improve
partner's
standard of
professionalism
partner will take
their
involvement
more seriously
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Release 2013-009
Name
Steven
Morrison,
CPA, Chair,
FICPA
Accounting
Principles and
Auditing
Standards
Committee

Company/
Organization

Florida Institute of
Certified Public
Accountants

William F.
Casey, Jr.,
retired CPA
David York
James J.
Gerace, CPA,
Chair, Audit
and Assurance
Services
Committee
Senator Carl
Levin,
Chairman,
Permanent
Subcommittee
on
Investigations

IO

Date
Submitted

2/3/2014

Support
Audit
Change?

Reasons

N

investors would
not have all the
facts needed to
judge the
partner's
performance
and expertise
improved audit
reporting/
information
overload

S

2/2/2014

Y

Association of
Chartered Certified
Accountants

P

2/3/2014

Y

Illinois CPA Society

IO

2/3/2014

N

US Senate Committee
on Homeland Security
and Gov't Affairs

IO

2/3/2014

Y

S

2/3/2014

N

Risk to those
named on the
audit

IO

2/3/2014

N

No useful
purpose

N

Could result in
practical
challenges and
liability

Nick O.
Sagona, Jr.
Sandra K.
Brown, CPA,
Chair,
Professional
Standards
Committee
Cynthia M.
Fornelli,
Executive
Director

Respondent
Type

Texas Society of
CPAs

Center for Audit
Quality

IO

2/3/2014
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Release 2013-009
Name
Ashley W.
Burrowes
PhD, CMA,
FCA, Visiting
Professor
PW Carey
William R.
Kinney, Jr.,
Charles and
Elizabeth
Prothro
Regents Chair
in Business

Company/
Organization

Respondent
Type

Date
Submitted

Support
Audit
Change?

Univ. of Canterbury

A

2/1/2014

N

S

2/3/2014

N

A

2/3/2014

Y

AF

2/3/2014

Y

McCombs School of
Business, The Univ. of
Texas at Austin

Deloitte & Touche
LLP

Al Khan

BKD, LLP

Nicholas J.
Satriano,
Chief
Accountant
and Senior
Associate
Director

Reasons

Federal Housing
Finance Agency

S

2/3/2014

Y

IO

2/3/2014

N

IO

1/31/2014

Y

Would provide
transparency/
should also
include # years
experience
would not
improve audit
quality, and
investors would
suffer
unintended
consequences
engagement
partner plays a
critical role in
ensuring the
overall quality
of the audit
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Release 2013-009
Name

J. Michael
Kirkland,
President

Michael D.
Feinstein,
Chair,
Accounting
Principles and
Auditing
Standards
Committee
Katharine E
Bagshaw
FCZ, Audit
and Assurance
Faculty

Company/
Organization

Respondent
Type

Date
Submitted

Support
Audit
Change?

NY State Society of
CPAs

IO

2/4/2014

N

PwC LLP

AF

2/4/2014

N

Reasons
this info would
be better off in
another place
like the
PCAOB's
periodic
reporting forms
may not provide
meaningful
information to
the users, also
potential
litigation

will be of little
use to anyone
CA Society of CPAs

Institute of Chartered
Accountants in
England and Wales
BDO USA, LLP

IO

IO

2/4/2014

2/5/2014

N

Y

IO

2/6/2014

N

William
Casey, CPA
retired

S

2/1/2014

Y

Charles T.
Fagan, CPA,
MBA,
CGMA, CFE

P

2/10/2014

Y

investors want
it, and it will do
no harm
does not
provide
meaningful
information
engagement
partner used to
sign his/her
name back in
1966
signing partner
has ultimate
responsibility
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Release 2013-009
Name
Ken Daly,
President and
CEO; Reatha
Clark King,
Chair

Company/
Organization

Respondent
Type

Date
Submitted

Support
Audit
Change?

Reasons
Will not
provide
worthwhile
information to
investors

National Assoc. of
Corporate Directors

IO

2/10/2014

N

EY LLP
Grant Thornton LLP

AF
AF

2/12/2014
2/3/2014

N
N

Crowe Horwath LLP
Charles A.
Bowsher
KPMG LLP

AF
A
P
IO
S

AF

2/12/2014

N

S

2/26/2014

Y

AF

3/13/2014

N

not sufficient
objective data
and research to
support this
increased audit
work quality
litigation risks

Respondent Type: Legend
Audit Firm
Academic
Preparer
Independent Organization
Stakeholder
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Table 10:
Release 2013-005
Name

Company/
Organization

Mary Ellen
Oliverio
Theresa
Barnett,
CPA

Respondent
Type

Date
Submitted

Support
Audit
Change
?

S

8/13/2013

N

P

9/2/2013

Y

Charles J
Siegel,
Senior Vice
PresidentFinance

Anworth Mortgage
Asset Corporation

IO

9/25/2013

N

Arthur J.
Radin

Radin, Glass & Co.,
LLP

AF

10/7/2013

N

Dennis R.
Beresford,
Executive
in
Residence
Karim
Jamal, CA
Chair
Professor
Steven E.
Buller,
Managing
Director

Jack Henry

Reasons

Would assist public
investors
potential to create
misunderstanding by
the investors, blur
the roles between
auditors,
management, and
the audit committee,
costly to implement
would add no
information for users
of financial
statements; costs
issuers money

Univ. of Georgia

A

10/11/201
3

N

make it more
difficult for readers
to even locate the
opinion

Univ. of Alberta,
School of Business

A

10/14/201
3

N

likely to produce
uninformative and
longer reports

Y

would enhance
auditor
communications and
information useful to
users

BlackRock, Inc.

IO

S

10/30/201
3

11/4/2013

N

These proposals will
not solve any
existing problem
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Release 2013-005
Name
Steven
Morrison,
CPA,
Chair,
Accounting
Principles
and
Auditing
Standards
Committee
Nancy J.
Schroeder,
CPA,
Chair,
Financial
Reporting
Committee

Company/
Organization

Respondent
Type

Date
Submitted

Support
Audit
Change
?

FL Institute of
Certified Public
Accountants

IO

10/18/201
3

N

Institute of
Management
Accountants

Chris
Barnard,
Actuary
Sherman A
Myers,
Director,
Corporate
and
Governmen
t Ratings
Michael D.
Feinstein,
Chair,
Accounting
Principles
and
Auditing
Standards
Committee

Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services

CA Society of
CPAs

IO

11/12/201
3

N

Reasons

would increase audit
time, and would not
achieve the intended
objective

S

11/18/201
3

Y

increase
understanding of the
audit process and its
risks, reliance, and
limitations

IO

11/21/201
3

Y

will increase the
usefulness of the
report

IO

11/25/201
3

N

results in a perceived
difference in audit
quality when none
should exist
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Release 2013-005
Name

Lee White,
CEO

Richard D.
Levy,
Executive
Vice
President &
Controller
Roger
Harrington,
Vice
President &
Chief
Accounting
Officer
Jack T.
Ciesielski,
President
scar
Munoz,
Audit
Committee
Chairman,
Board
Member

Tom
Quaadman,
Vice
President

Company/
Organization

Institute of
Chartered
Accountants
Australia

Wells Fargo &
Company

Respondent
Type

IO

IO

Date
Submitted

12/2/2013

12/2/2013

Support
Audit
Change
?

N

N

may duplicate
information
presented as critical
accounting policies
or judgments

IO

12/3/2013

N

R.G. Associates,
Inc.

IO

12/4/2013

Y

United Continental
Holdings, Inc.

IO

BBD, LLP

AF

U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Center
for Capital Markets
Competitiveness

IO

12/9/2013

12/9/2013

could create
unnecessary
complication for
users and can inhibit
understanding and
confidence in the
audit process
may be construed as
creating a perception
that there may be
weaknesses or
deficiencies in
management’s
judgment, FS
estimates, or Internal
Controls

BP p.I.c.

12/6/2013

Reasons

N

N

N

does not address
investor needs by
creating overlap and
competition with
other regulatory
mandates
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Release 2013-005
Name
Gregory
Giugliano,
Partner-inCharge of
Assurance
Services
Brandon
Rees,
Acting
Director,
Office of
Investment
Sandra K.
Brown
Terrence R.
Marcinko,
Director
Finance &
Accounting
Loretts V.
Cangialosi
David
York, Head
of Auditing
Practice
Carlos E.
Johnson,
NASBA
Chair
Mary Kay
Scucci,
Managing
Director

Company/
Organization

Respondent
Type

Date
Submitted

Support
Audit
Change
?

Marcum LLP
AF
American
Federation of Labor
and Congress of
Industrial
Organizations
WeiserMazars LLP
Texas Society of
CPAs
Aerospace
Industries
Association

12/9/2013

N

Reasons

could result in a
perceived difference
in audit quality
where none exists
must be further
strengthened to
provide investors
with useful new
information

IO

12/9/2013

N

AF

12/9/2013
12/10/201
3

N

12/9/2013

N

takes too much time

will not result in
improved quality of
the audit and may
cause less focused
quality checks

IO

IO

N

Pfizer Inc.

IO

12/10/201
3

N

Association of
Chartered Certified
Accountants

IO

12/10/201
3

Y

NASBA

IO

12/9/2013

Y

IO

12/10/201
3

N

SIFMA
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Release 2013-005
Name

Mark
Davies,
Chair

Company/
Organization

Respondent
Type

Auditing and
Assurance
Standards Board
Canada
IO

Renee
Rampulla,
Leader
Accounting
and
Auditing
Standards
Interest
Group

J. Michael
Kirkland,
President
Luca
Maestri,
Vice
President
and
Corporate
Controller

Date
Submitted

Support
Audit
Change
?

12/11/201
3

N

Reasons

may create
confusion for readers
of auditor’s reports
on financial
statements of
Canadian SEC
registrants

inclusion of CAMs
may create incorrect
perception that there
are varying degrees
of an unqualified
report
NJ Society of CPAs

IO

12/10/201
3

N

McGladrey LLP

AF

12/10/201
3

N

Capital Group

IO

12/9/2013

N

NY State Society of
CPAs

IO

12/10/201
3

N

Apple, Inc.

IO

12/10/201
3

N

would not provide
investment-decisionusefulinformation/could
alter the roles of
management and the
auditor
users may
misinterpret multiple
CAMs as an issue of
FS quality

will not enhance the
auditor's reporting
model, and will
increase the cost and
scope of the audit

32 | P a g e

Release 2013-005
Name
James
Campbell,
Finance
Vice
President
and
Corporate
Controller
George S.
Davis,
Executive
VP and
CFO
Andre
Kilesse,
President
Cynthia M.
Fornelli,
Executive
Director
Sayaka
Sumida,
Executive
Board
MemberAuditing
Standards
John L.
Merino,
Corporate
VP and
Principal
Accounting
Officer

Company/
Organization

Intel Corporation

Respondent
Type

IO

Date
Submitted

12/10/201
3

Support
Audit
Change
?

Reasons

N

may blur the lines of
responsibility
between
management and the
auditor
could be confusing
to investors and
other FS users/
would result in an
increase in audit fees

Qualcomm
Incorporated

IO

12/10/201
3

N

Federation of
European
Accountants

IO

12/11/201
3

Y

Center for Audit
Quality

IO

12/11/201
3

Y

The Japanese
Institute of CPAs

IO

12/11/201
3

N

FedEx Corporation

IO

12/11/201
3

N

CAMs will not
address the issues in
the PCAOB proposal
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Release 2013-005
Name
James J.
Gerace,
CPA,
Chair,
Audit and
Assurance
Services
Committee

Chet
Hebert,
Chairman
& CEO

Bernard F.
Pliska, VP,
Corporate
Controller,
Principal
Accounting

Glenn W.
Reed,
Managing
Director,
Strategy
and Finance
Group

Company/
Organization

Illinois CPA
Society

Respondent
Type

IO

Colorado Financial
Service Corporation

IO

Deloitte & Touche
LLP

AF

PwC LLP

AF

Grant Thornton
LLP

AF

Date
Submitted

12/11/201
3

12/11/201
3
12/11/201
3
12/11/201
3
12/11/201
3

Support
Audit
Change
?

Reasons

N

will not provide
meaningful
information, will be
costly to produce

N

will inflict
significant costs,
with little or no
relevance to the
mission of the
PCAOB

Y
Y
Y

Nike, Inc.

IO

12/11/201
3

N

KPMG LLP

AF

12/11/201
3

Y

Vanguard

IO

12/11/201
3

Y

EY LLP

AF

12/18/201
3

Y

would not provide
material benefits but
may cause confusion
to investors, increase
costs
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Release 2013-005
Name

Company/
Organization

Respondent
Type

Date
Submitted

Support
Audit
Change
?

Robert F.
Storch,
FDIC

FDIC

IO

2/6/2014

Y

AF
A
P
IO
S

Reasons

will provide useful
information

Respondent Type: Legend
Audit Firm
Academic
Preparer
Independent Organization
Stakeholder
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